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Jenni Millbank’s incisive article, ‘Reflecting the “human nature” of IVF embryos: dis-
appearing women in ethics, law and fertility practice’,1 takes issue with the prevailing
concentration on ‘respect for the embryo’ in guidelines and statutes concerning em-
bryo storage. She argues that there is insufficient regard for the specific significance of
embryos to the womenwho underwent complex and difficult IVF procedures to create
them. Such a fixation, she asserts, effectively makes these women ‘disappear’, failing to
show respect for their effort, dignity, and agency. Here she cites the argument by Isabel
Karpin that:
The embryo is only connected with its potential for personhood by female embodiment.
Those who wish to make the argument that all embryos have equivalent value do so only
by rendering the female body irrelevant. In order to do this, a complex process of disap-
pearing has to take place.2
Millbank concentrates on storage and destruction of embryos in IVF practice, as is
perfectly right and proper. There is an urgent need to do so, she writes, because ‘deci-
sions about storage and destruction are critical conflict points that have triggered ex-
pressions of dismay by IVF participants. . .These are not the only areas in which ART
law and policy prioritize a universalized and disembodied respect for the embryo over
and above the feelings and wishes of those who created them, but they are the most
acute and, particularly in the case of destruction, the most painfully paradoxical’.3
1 JenniMillbank, Reflecting the ‘Human Nature’ of IVF Embryos: DisappearingWomen in Ethics, Law and Fertility
Practice, J. L. & BIOSCI. (2016) DOI: 10.1093/jlb/lsw058.
2 Isabel Karpin,TheUncanny Embryos: Legal Limits to the Human and ReproductionWithout Women, 28 SYDNEY
L. REV. J. 600, 603 (2006).
3 Millbank, supra note 1, at 23.
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However, the phenomenon of the disappearing woman is much more general: part
and parcel of the way in which ‘the lady vanishes’ in bioethics debate.4 I first identified
this worrying tendencymore than 10 years ago, in relation to somatic cell nuclear trans-
fer (SCNT) stem cell research. It has resurfaced recently in the debate about so-called
mitochondrial transfer or three-parent IVF5, but it never really went away. In much
public policy and academic discussion about biomedicine, the lady has vanished and is
still missing.
The new reproductive biotechnologies have largely failed to recognize either
women’s labor in creating ‘biovalue’ or women’s related rights of ownership over the
products of their ‘clinical labor’.6 Popular misconceptions to the contrary, we do not
necessarily own our bodies, because we have not generally labored to create them. In
the view of property as deriving from labor, on which those unlikely bedfellows Locke
and Marx concur, we may own objects resulting from the labor of our bodies, but not
our bodies as such.7 This interpretation is consistent with the view of the subject as em-
bodied, to which Millbank refers, and with the desire to avoid objectification or com-
modification of the body,8 which opens up as a possibility once we admit the notion
that bodies can be owned.
However, womendo labor to produce ova used for IVF and research, for example, in
some stem cell technologies and in so-called mitochondrial transfer.These ova are not
mere waste or abandoned tissue: they are extracted, in multiple and unnatural quanti-
ties, through laborious and risky procedures.9 Similar processes are also involved in the
creation of embryos for IVF, although, as Millbank argues, they are insufficiently rec-
ognized when only the moral status of the embryo is said to count. Instead, she writes,
‘It is [the woman’s] embodied effort, pain, and sacrifice in IVF processes that call for
regard to be given to [embryos]’.10
Likewise, in a prominent case of research, academics and media commentators vir-
tually ignored the contribution of the women who had produced the necessary ova. In
SCNT stem cell research, an adult somatic cell is transferred into an egg that has had its
nucleus removed. The remaining cytoplasm within the egg ‘reprogrammes’ the trans-
ferred nucleus, creating a blastocyst (a very early-stage embryo) that can theoretically
be transformed into a stem cell line tissue matched to the donor of the somatic cell.
The ostensible SCNTpioneerHwangWoo Suk used over 2,200 eggs from 129women
(some of them his own junior researchers, others paid ‘donors’) in what was later re-
vealed to be fraudulent research.11
4 Donna Dickenson,The Lady Vanishes: What’s Missing from the Stem Cell Debate, 3 J. BIOETHICAL INQUIRY 43
(2006); DONNA DICKENSON, PROPERTY IN THE BODY: FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES (2nd ed. 2017).
5 Donna Dickenson, The Commercialization of Human Eggs in Mitochondrial Replacement Research, 19 NEW
BIOETHICS 18 (2013).
6 MELINDA COOPER & CATHERINE WALDBY, CLINICAL LABOR: TISSUE DONORS AND RESEARCH SUBJECTS IN THE
GLOBAL BIOECONOMY (2014).
7 DONNA DICKENSON, PROPERTY IN THE BODY; JEREMYWALDRON, THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY (1988).
8 DONNA DICKENSON, BODY SHOPPING: CONVERTING BODY PARTS TO PROFIT (2009).
9 For an assessment of the clinical risks involved in ova donation, see LINDA GIUDICE, EILEEN SANTA & ROBERT
POOL, ASSESSING THE MEDICAL RISKS OF HUMAN OOCYTE DONATION FOR STEM CELL RESEARCH, INSTITUTE
OFMEDICINE AND NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES WORKSHOP REPORT (2007).
10 Millbank, supra note 1, at 18.
11 Francoise Baylis, For Love or Money: The Saga of the Korean Women Who Provided Eggs for Stem Cell Research,
30 THEOR. MED. BIOETHICS 385 (2009).
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The relevant point is not that the findings were bogus, but that very few commenta-
tors askedwhere all these eggs had come fromandwhether the labor of thewomenwho
produced them had been valued properly.WhenHwang announced his supposed new
technology involving cloned blastocysts,12 followed by a later announcement of suc-
cessful development of patient-specific embryonic stem cells that could serve as virtual
‘spare parts kits’ for patients,13 debate instead revolved almost entirely around the im-
plications for the moral status of the embryo.14 Here is a clear parallel toMillbank’s ar-
gument that women’s labor in creating IVF embryos is insufficiently recognized, when
the only ethical issue is seen as respect for the embryo.
On the one hand, the recalcitrance of opponents of embryonic and SCNT stem cell
technologies was generally grounded in the assertions that the embryo is either a hu-
man being or a potential human being, and that it is wrong to destroy an existing or
potential human being in order to produce stem cell lines. Proponents’ justifications
of such research were more disparate, but not varied enough to escape the charge of
obsession with the status of the embryo. What united the two contending sides in the
stem cell wars was that the women from whom the necessary eggs would have to be
taken were equally invisible to both.
Only after critical investigations by the journalist David Cyranoski15 and the femi-
nist activist groupKoreanWomenlinkwas it revealed that someofHwang’s ‘volunteers’
were actually his junior researchers, and that Hwang had grossly understated both the
number of women fromwhom he took eggs and the quantity he took. Hwang declared
in his first article that he had used a total of 242 eggs from 16 women, while his second
article admitted to taking 185 eggs from 18 women. In fact the figures that eventually
emerged were almost 10 times as high: 2,221 ova from 119 women. To get this huge
number of eggs would require intense hormone stimulation; unsurprisingly but shock-
ingly, the incidence of ovarian hyperstimulation syndrome (OHSS) among Hwang’s
donors was over 17 per cent. One woman who had to be hospitalized for OHSS was
then subjected to a second cycle of donation. A high proportion of eggswere purchased
outright in an international trade, contravening Korean law and obviously commodify-
ing the ova.16
Nearly a decade later, the debate around permitting research into three-parent IVF
once again demonstrated the phenomenon of ‘disappearing women’. Like SCNT re-
search, this process requires an enucleated egg from a healthy donor, into which a
12 Hwang Woo Suk et al., Evidence of a Pluripotent Human Embryonic Stem Cell Line Derived from a Cloned Blas-
tocyst, 303 SCIENCE 1669 (2004).
13 Hwang Woo-Suk et al., Patient-Specific Embryonic Stem Cells Derived from Human SCNT Blastocysts, 308 SCI-
ENCE 1777 (2005).
14 See, for example, Emily Jackson, Fraudulent Stem Cell Research and Respect for the Embryo, 1 BIOSCIENCES 349
(2006). For an international comparative survey of ethical issues perceived as relevant in stem cell research,
see Herbert Gottweis & Barbara Prainsack, Emotion in Political Discourse: Approaches to Stem Cell Governance
in the USA, UK, Israel and Germany, 6 REPROD. MED. 823 (2006).
15 David Cyranoski, Korea’s Stem-Cell Stars Dogged by Suspicion of Ethical Breach, 429 NATURE 3 (2004).
DOI:10.1038/429003a.
16 All figures are taken from Baylis, supra note 11. Similar figures are cited in Robert Steinbrook, Egg Donation
and Human Embryonic Stem-Cell Research, 354 NEW ENG. J. MED 324 (2006).
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somatic cell from a woman with mitochondrial disease is inserted.17 Proponents of
the techniques, however, camouflaged that requirement by using the inaccurate term
‘mitochondrial transfer’, ignoring the fact thatmitochondria only come ready-packaged
in eggs.
The term is also inaccurate because it is actually the nucleus that is being transferred,
not themitochondria. As David Albert Jones wrote, ‘It is not themitochondria that are
“donated” or “replaced”. . . It is the healthy egg from the egg donor that is “modified”,
and it ismodified by replacement of its nuclearDNA.’18 Joneswent on to remark on the
way in which the vanishing lady was still missing: ‘The contemporary situation is just
as it was in 2006 when Donna Dickenson remarked that ‘the women from whom the
ova are taken have virtually disappeared from view’ or in 2008 when Francoise Baylis
observed that ‘their eggs are regarded asmere receptacles and their reproductive labour
is taken for granted’.19
Millbank writes: ‘I suggest that we still do not ask, as we ought to, “What is the re-
spect due to the woman undertaking treatment?”’ In the debates around both SCNT
research and ‘mitochondrial transfer’, very little respect was paid to the women un-
dertaking the treatment necessary for ova provision. The very terminology of ‘mito-
chondrial transfer’ ignores the need for eggs, and therefore the existence of the women
who provide them. Defenders of the technology dismiss the term ‘three-parent IVF’ as
sensationalistic—although it is actually more accurate—by denying that the donor of
the egg with the healthy mitochondria is a parent, because there are fewer genes in mi-
tochondria than in the somatic nucleus.20 This, too, demonstrates a profound lack of
respect for what women undergo in the laborious and risk-laden process of egg dona-
tion, and more broadly, for their altruism, agency, and dignity.
How can we rectify this neglect of women’s contribution and make the lady re-
appear?That is, of course, a huge question, but in the particular instance of fertility prac-
tice studied byMillbank, oneway to givewomenmore saymight be through amodified
propertymodel.When clinics destroy embryos after a specified time period, against the
wishes of the womenwhose ova were used to create them, they are acting as if they and
not those women have property rights in the embryos. That assumption is sanctioned
in legislation and clinical guidelines, but it is only a presumption: one with whichmany
women are deeply uncomfortable. The womenMillbank interviewed typically want to
have the right to dispose of their embryos as they see fit. As she notes, ‘Many of these
interviewees expressed intense distress and dismay when faced with the operation of
legal rules or clinical policies that they experienced as intruding upon their decision
making.’21
In light of recent case law, clinics’ property in embryos also looks like an increasingly
dubious presumption. Although the ‘no-property’ rule about the body has generally
17 Here I describe the particular form of ‘mitochondrial transfer’ known as maternal spindle technique, which
involves modifying eggs prior to fertilization. A second technique, pronuclear transfer, involves modification
of embryos. Both methods require eggs from an egg donor with healthy mitochondria.
18 David Albert Jones,TheOtherWoman: Evaluating the Language of “Three Parent” Embryos, 10 CLIN. ETHICS 98
(2015).
19 Jones, supra note 18, at 103, citing Dickenson,The Lady Vanishes, and Francoise Baylis, Animal Eggs for Stem
Cell Research: A Path Not Worth Taking, 8 AM. J. BIOETHICS 18 (2008).
20 See, for example, UKDepartment of Health,Mitochondrial Donation, section 1.25 (2014).
21 Millbank, supra note 1, at 5.
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prevailed in the common law,22 meaning that patients lack ongoing rights in their ex-
tracted tissue, a leading case in England, Yearworth, held that men retained sufficiently
property-like rights in their stored tissue to ground an action in bailment against the
hospital that hadnegligently destroyed their sperm.23 Given thatwomen’s entitlements
in their persons and bodies have traditionally been fewer than men’s,24 however, we
should not necessarily assume that female tissue will be brought under the same rubric.
The lawhas so far failed to consider thatwomenput greater labor into extractionof eggs,
and thus into the creation of embryos, than men undergo in the collection of sperm.
This omission is highly relevant in cases that have upheld men’s rights against
women’s entitlements over the usage of stored IVF embryos.25 One such case, Evans
v Amicus Healthcare Trust, concerned a woman diagnosed with ovarian cancer, who
had produced embryos with her then partner as a precaution against sterility follow-
ing her operation. (Note the strong resemblance to Yearworth, in which men likewise
diagnosed with cancer had produced sperm as insurance against infertility following
their operations.)The male partner’s right to withdraw consent to implantation of the
embryos was upheld by the court over any property right that Evans had in the em-
bryos. Apparently the court prioritized theHFEA’s statutory liability to ensure consent
of both partners, while in Yearworth property remedies were sought.26
Prioritizing the claims and liabilities of clinics and regulatory agencies, however,
rests on the prior assumption that clinics do have property rights in stored embryos,
whereas women undergoing treatment do not. Otherwise clinics would have no en-
titlement to destroy embryos after a given period of time or to make other decisions
about their disposal. When a clinic allows a woman to take embryos home for storage,
as occurred in the case of one woman interviewed by Millbank, it is not surrendering
its general property entitlement tomanage the disposal of the embryos, but only allow-
ing a change of storage location. (Presumably embryos stored under home conditions
would become clinically unviable, so the effect is the same to the clinic as destruction,
although very different to the woman.)
Whether or not a court would uphold the presumption that clinics have prop-
erty rights in stored embryos, which women lack, I would argue that such a pre-
sumption should not hold. Instead, we need to implement a modified property rights
model to recognize women’s labor, intentionality and agency in producing embryos.
Common-law jurisprudence typically views property as a set of relationships between
persons, not as a thing in itself.27 This emphasis on property as relationship is entirely
22 Moore v. Regents of the University of California, 51 Cal. 3rd 120, 793 P. 2d, 271 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1990); JESSE
WALL, BEING AND OWNING: THE BODY, BODILY MATERIAL, AND THE LAW (2015).
23 Yearworth and Others v. North Bristol NHS Trust, EWCA Civ 37; [2010] QB 1 (2009). For analysis of the
case, see inter alia: Muireann Quigley, Property: The Future of Human Tissue? (2009) 17 MED. L. REV. 457;
James Lee,TheFertile Imagination of the Common Law: Yearworth v.North Bristol NHSTrust (2009) 17 TORTS
L. J. 130; and ShawnH.E.Harmon&GraemeLaurie,Yearworth v.North Bristol NHSTrust:Property, Principles
and Paradigms, 69 CAMBRIDGE L. J. 476–93 (2010).
24 CAROLE PATEMAN, THE SEXUAL CONTRACT (1988); DONNA DICKENSON, PROPERTY, WOMEN AND POLITICS:
SUBJECTS OR OBJECTS? (1997).
25 Evans v. Amicus Healthcare Ltd., E.W.C.A. Civ. 727 (2004); Additionally, in Yearworth there was no conflict
between male and female gamete donors; only the men were claimants.
26 JesseWall,The Legal Status of Body Parts: A Framework, 31 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 783 (2011)
27 WESLEYNEWCOMBHOHFELD, FUNDAMENTALLEGALCONCEPTIONSASAPPLIED IN JUDICIALREASONING (1919).
For a schematic analysis of how particular combinations of rights from the ‘bundle’ might be applied to bio-
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consistent with feminist theory, which has frequently foregrounded relationships and
relatedness, as doesMillbank herself.28 Properly understood, property is a concept that
can empower women, although it is frequently misunderstood as subjugating them. As
the legal theorist Carol Rose points out, there has been far more feminist interest in
women as objects of property than as subjects, who, I would add, might hold and ben-
efit from property rights relevant to their own bodies.29
A modified property model for embryo storage emphatically does not mean com-
modifying embryos. The limited property rights that women would probably seek—
judging from Millbank’s interviews—have nothing to do with sale, income, or profit.
Rather, they have to do with those sticks in the differentiated property ‘bundle’30 that
concernmanagementof theobject of property, and the right to excludeothers from tak-
ing decisions over it with which I do not concur. In Yearworth, the hospital contended
that the men had no property in their sperm because they could not direct its use with-
out the assistance of the hospital. However, the court rejected that unitary conception
of property, denying that this limitation meant the men had no property rights what-
soever.31 One need not have every ‘stick’ in the property bundle to have some mean-
ingful rights. When women’s agency and views about the disposal of their embryos are
overridden, and the discussion centers almost entirely on the status of the embryo, a
modified property regime in embryos could provide the recognition and control that
women need and deserve.
Here is a familiar example of a modified property regime: to the extent that I have
a property in my vote, it does not encompass any right to sell my vote, or even to give
my vote away; but it does include the right to prevent any unauthorized person from
voting in my name, and more generally the right to use my vote as I see fit. Likewise,
the women interviewed byMillbank want to have the right to dispose of their embryos
as they see fit: nothing more earth shattering than that.
materials, see Barbro Bjorkman& SvenOveHansson,Bodily Rights and Property Rights, 32 J.MED. ETHICS 209
(2006).
28 See, for example, MARY JEANNE LARRABEE (ed.), AN ETHIC OF CARE (1993); HILDE LINDEMANN NELSON &
JAMESLINDEMANNNELSON, THEPATIENT IN THEFAMILY (1995); VIRGINIAHELD, FEMINISTMORALITY (1993);
and PETA BOWDEN, CARING: GENDER-SENSITIVE ETHICS (1997).
29 CAROLM. ROSE, PROPERTY AND PERSUASION: ESSAYS ON THE HISTORY, THEORY AND RHETORIC OF OWNERSHIP
(1994).
30 A. M. Honore´, Ownership, originally published in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE (Anthony G. Guest ed.,
1961), reprinted in A. M. HONORE´, MAKING LAW BIND: ESSAYS LEGAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL 161 (1987);
Dickenson, supra note 4, ch. 1.
31 Muireann Quigley, supra note 23.
